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Abstract 
This paper uses evidence from a series of studies of young people in a total of 12 ex-
communist countries, but mainly from surveys in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
in 2007, and discusses changes and continuities since the early-1990s in typical 
labour market experiences. It is argued that the continuities outweigh the changes. 
In the early years of transition new career groups were created during the 
undermining of old types of employment and the emergence of new market-led 
employment opportunities. There have always been differences between countries, 
and between regions within countries, in the proportions of young people following 
different career routes. Similarly, there have been changes over time in some places 
in the proportions following the different career paths. Yet the evidence indicates 
that the career paths themselves have remained remarkably constant over time, 
and across different territories. The main career groups are: i. A small group who 
obtain jobs paying salaries that will support a western-type lifestyle. ii. Continuous 
regular private or public sector employment. iii. Business. iv. Under-employment. v. 
Unemployment. The paper discusses the processes that have created and which are 
maintaining the divisions between these groups 
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1. Introduction 
In nearly every East-Central European and ex-Soviet country, an initial effect of ‘the 
transition’ was a steep decline in economic output. The shock of abandoning ‘the 
plan’, the old command economy, was compounded by the shock-therapy policies 
recommended by a Washington consensus (see Gerber and Hout, 1998; Gros, 
1997). Up to 50%, sometimes more, was ripped from people’s standards of living. 
The impact was akin to a major war. Real wars, where these broke out, aggravated 
the countries’ economic difficulties. A few countries escaped the shock. It proved 
advantageous to be a small country on the borders on the European Union (as in 
1989). Slovenia, with a population of under 2 million and bordering Italy and 
Austria, has been a showcase success story. Hungary and the Czech Republic also 
survived the first years of transition with relatively little pain, but recovery, when it 
commenced, was weaker in these countries than elsewhere. Particular enterprises 
and sometimes entire towns and regions escaped the shock. This is was usually due 
to plant managers or regional or local governments displaying hitherto suppressed 
entrepreneurial flair (see Michailova and Mills, 1998). Other regions, where the 
main employers shut down as soon as communism ended, were still awaiting the 
arrival of therapeutic market forces in the first decade of the 21
st
 century  (see 
Tarkhnishvili et al, 2005). However, every single country began to record economic 
growth at some stage during the 1990s. Growth rates have been spectacular in 
countries with fairly small populations relative to their oil and gas reserves 
(specifically Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan). Elsewhere sustained growth rates 
approaching 10% per annum have been common. This paper considers the effects 
of this sustained recovery (as portrayed in official statistics) on the labour market 
prospects of young people. 
Evidence  
The detailed evidence to follow is from surveys conducted in 2007 among 
representative samples of 31-37 year olds, approximately 200 from each of two 
regions, the capital city and a comparator region, in each of the three South 
Caucasus countries: Yerevan and Kotayk in Armenia, Baku and Aran-Mugan in 
Azerbaijan, and Tbilisi and Shida Kartli in Georgia. The respondents were a sub-
sample from the 2005 Data Initiative Survey which was based on representative 
samples of households in these same regions (Caucasus Research Resource Centre, 
2005). The target population in the 2007 survey was everyone in these households 
in 2005 who was born between 1970 and 1976, and therefore was aged 31-37 in 
2007. The achieved samples were those who were still at the same addresses and 
available for interview, or who had moved but could be traced and interviewed at 
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their new addresses. The interviews gathered information about the respondents’ 
biographies in education and the labour market, family relationships and housing, 
and leisure activities, from age 16 up to the present (in 2007). Here we focus on the 
samples’ careers in education and the labour market. The respondents were all 
aged at least 31 when interviewed, thus we have complete biographies for 
everyone from age 16 to 30. 
This 2007 fieldwork was the latest in a series of investigations that commenced at 
the beginning of the 1990s in three regions of Poland (see Roberts and Jung, 2005), 
and has since investigated young people in a total of 12 different ex-communist 
countries. In some places, including the capitals of Armenia and Georgia, young 
people have been studied on successive occasions – in 1997 and 2002 as well as in 
2007 in these particular cases. In Poland the respondents were quite recent school 
and university leavers. In successive enquiries the samples have become older – 
mid-20s, then late-20s, then 30s. This has been in response to the lengthening of 
school-to-work transitions – a global trend rather than confined to East-Central 
Europe and the ex-USSR. The projects have not produced standardised time series 
data. Each project has been ad hoc, reflecting the processes of research funding. 
Over time, we believe, our methods of investigation, including our questions about 
careers in education and the labour market, have improved. Also, the design of 
each investigation has been sensitive to the specificities of the regions and 
countries concerned at the particular time. For example, our operational 
definitions of a ‘full salary’ have necessarily varied according to time and place. 
Even so, the successive enquiries offer some clear indications about similarities and 
differences in how young people have fared in different parts of the ex-communist 
bloc, and changes and continuities since the early-1990s. 
The theoretical base of all these investigations has been opportunity structure 
theory (see Roberts 1968 for the initial statement). This is a sociological theory 
which contends that young people move along different career routes that are 
created by the inter-relationships between family backgrounds, education, and 
firms’ recruitment, training and employment practices. Thus the problem in 
approaching any country, region or locality is always, first, to establish the 
character of the career routes that are in existence, how these routes have been 
created, and how they are being maintained or changed, and then to investigate 
which kinds of young people enter different routes, and where the routes lead. 
The core contention in this paper is that there have been impressive similarities in 
the answers to these questions between countries throughout East-Central Europe 
and the former Soviet Union, and equally impressive continuities across time. New 
career groups, occupying new labour market segments, were formed in the early 
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stages of the countries’ historical transitions. Of course, there have been 
differences between countries, and by place within countries, in the proportions of 
young people entering the different career routes and thereby forming distinct 
career groups, and there have been similar differences in the extent of change over 
time, but the groups themselves have remained remarkably constant. The 
argument to follow, if correct, offers another example of path dependence (see 
Stark and Bruszt, 1998). Path dependency theory is based on more than the trite 
observation that history matters. The contention is that at particular historical 
junctures there is exceptional scope for agency, for choices to be made, usually in 
the modern world by political actors, and that the outcomes of these choices 
create pathways for future developments, which countries follow until there is a 
further historical unfreezing. Here we argue that subsequent developments in 
young people’s career opportunities have occurred within structures formed during 
the critical initial stages of the historical transformations of the former communist 
countries. 
Youth labour markets in the 1990s 
Studies in Tbilisi (Georgia), all Armenia, Lviv, Dneipropetrovsk and Donetsk 
(Ukraine), and Moscow and Vladikavkaz (Russia) at various points in the 1990s 
consistently identified the same four youth career groups (see Roberts, 1998; 
Roberts and Fagan, 1999; Roberts et al, 2000; Roberts et al, 2002). 
i. Fully employed. This group never amounted to the majority in a local labour 
market. By fully employed we mean that they were in work more or less 
continuously from leaving full-time education, in full-time jobs which paid full 
salaries by local standards at the time. In the research in the South Caucasus in 
1995 a threshold of reported earnings of USD 30 a month was used to separate 
‘full’ from other salaries. In 1999 in Russia and Ukraine the reported earnings 
threshold was set at USD 50. In the more recent research described above and 
reported below a higher and ‘adjusted’ threshold is used. 
We have always suspected, and we can now be certain, that in Eastern Europe and 
the ex-USSR young people (and adults) have tended to under-report their earnings 
by massive amounts. We now know that it makes no difference whether survey 
respondents are simply asked to state their monthly earnings, or presented with 
show cards and asked to indicate a band without naming a precise amount. They 
may remain suspicious that surveys will not remain anonymous. They may report 
official earnings which are different from their actual earnings. Income from second 
jobs may be ignored. We will explain below that real earnings are usually between 
twice and four times as high as respondents typically report. However, reported 
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earnings are our best basis for assessing trends over time, and in the South 
Caucasus in the mid-1990s a reported figure of USD 30 represented a full salary. 
The equivalent figure was USD 50 in 2002 and the equivalent figure in 2007 would 
have been USD 100, but in reporting the results from this latest research we will 
use adjusted earnings (which resemble actual earnings much more closely than the 
figures that respondents reported). The rising thresholds reflect growth over time 
in real salary levels, but in the 21
st
 century the growth has been partly ‘apparent’, 
an appearance created by the devaluation of the USD.  
All the surveys have found that full-time jobs with salaries that are both reasonable 
and paid regularly can be in the state sector, or in privatised or newly created 
private businesses. It has been apparent in all the investigations that some young 
people have obtained such jobs very early in their working lives, then remained 
continuously fully-employed even if they have needed or have otherwise chosen to 
change jobs (Roberts, 2006). A sub-group among this fully employed career group, 
and some of the self-employed (see below) have enjoyed exceptionally high 
earnings, capable of supporting a western-type lifestyle. They have been a very 
distinct, but also a very small career group in all the surveys. 
ii. Successfully self-employed. Everywhere in the 1990s up to 9% of the local young 
people were establishing themselves in business on a continuous basis, and they 
always saw their futures in terms of running their own enterprises. Often far more 
than 9% were self-employed, but the excess was always ‘survival self-employment’, 
usually trading (buying and selling) by young people who were doing this only 
because they were unable to obtain proper jobs, and their earnings were always 
beneath our threshold of ‘full pay’ (see Roberts et al, 1998). 
iii. Under-employed. In the 1990s we described these young people as holding ‘bitty 
jobs’. Our preferred term is now under-employed. Some bitty jobs have been in 
state or privatised businesses where there has been neither sufficient work to keep 
all staff fully occupied nor money to pay salaries regularly, So salaries have fallen 
into arrears. Occasionally employees have been paid ‘in kind’. Payments in kind 
between businesses were not uncommon in the ex-USSR throughout the 1990s 
(see Duffy, 2005). Other bitty jobs have been in new private businesses, typically 
shops, bars and restaurants, driving, and street selling where the employment has 
often been without a contract, casual, for less than full-time hours, and with 
monthly pay beneath the threshold for a full salary. Members of this career group 
have sometimes been employed intermittently rather than continuously. 
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iv. Unemployed. These young people have been out of work (including bitty jobs) 
for most of their time in the labour market. Their profile has been unlike that of the 
young unemployed in north-western Europe. In the ex-USSR, and also in studies in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (see Jung, 1997; Machacek and Roberts, 
1997, Roberts, 2001; Roberts et al, 1997), they have been from all kinds of 
educational and family backgrounds. Most have not been desperately poor 
compared with employed peers, many of whom were receiving pathetically low 
salaries, while some of the unemployed were in fact working in the second 
economies. Some were receiving money from their families (as were full-time 
students). Some of the unemployed have been part-time students. So were they 
really unemployed? ‘Yes’ in the young people’s eyes because they were engaged in 
their alternative activities only because they were unable to obtain proper jobs. 
The young unemployed were not a stigmatised underclass. Their families and the 
wider communities recognised that their unemployment was not the young 
people’s own fault but was due to economic circumstances. Some young women 
who defined themselves as unemployed were de facto full-time housewives. They 
wanted jobs that would be compatible with their domestic responsibilities (they 
would have held such jobs under communism). A minority, but only a minority, of 
the young unemployed were desperately poor and in despair, a condition usually 
shared with their entire families. However, most were not despairing. They 
regarded themselves as still in life stage transition, and their countries as still in 
transition, and most expected their own labour market difficulties to be temporary. 
For how long would they sustain this optimism? At some point they would surely 
have to regard both transitions as having ended. 
In western countries, if pressed to nominate a single statistic to indicate the 
degrees of difficulty confronting beginning workers, the choice of most social 
scientists will be the unemployment rate. This is indeed a good indicator in 
countries where most young people obtain proper jobs – full-time jobs, paying full 
salaries given the qualifications and ages of the entrants, and the occupations, 
while young people who are out-of-work are genuinely workless with no earned 
incomes. Unemployment rates are less effective indicators in the new market 
economies where there is considerable under-employment, and where many of the 
young people who regard themselves as unemployed would not pass the 
International Labour Office tests (no paid work in the last week, searched for a job 
during the last week, and willing to start more or less immediately if offered a 
suitable job). Also, very little of the youth unemployment in the new market 
economies is official, that is, registered at the Labour Offices. The single statistic 
that best indicates the degrees of difficulty confronting labour market entrants is 
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the proportion who become fully employed, which in many of the relevant local 
labour market is still a minority. 
The investigations in which the above four career groups (or five if the very 
successful fully-employed and self-employed are counted separately) were 
distinguished did not identify migrants as a separate career group. The surveys did 
not capture young people who had settled indefinitely in western Europe or North 
America. However, all the local surveys contained some in-migrants (to major cities 
in their countries), and also pendulum migrants who had returned after spells 
working abroad. In some cases earnings from abroad were enabling the young 
people and their families to subsist. Some had used their earnings from abroad to 
move into independent accommodation. In some cases the capital accumulated 
had been used to start a business. 
There were differences from place to place in the proportions of young people in 
the four career groups, but the groups themselves re-occurred in successive 
investigations, and the young people were always tending to remain within the 
same career groups throughout the early years of their working lives. How, if at all, 
have things changed now that the countries are approaching their third decade of 
transition? 
Findings 
Were young adults in the labour markets of the South Caucasus in 2007 split into 
the same career groups that were identified in the 1990s? Our evidence is from 
persons who were aged 31-37 in 2007, and who therefore became 16 sometime 
between 1986 and 1992. They began their labour market careers either in the late-
1980s when communism was breaking up (and breaking down) or in the ‘dark 
years’ of the early-1990s. Their young adult biographies coincide with the histories 
of their countries as new independent states and the development of their market 
economies. Strictly speaking, our evidence is about the first cohorts to come of age 
under post-communism. We have no direct evidence about how new school and 
college leavers were faring in 2007. However, they will have entered the same 
labour markets, segmented in the same ways, and with the same levels of 
unemployment, as evident in the biographies and current circumstances of the 31-
37 year olds in our enquiry. This is an example of path dependence. 
Variables 
i. Career groups. The samples were questioned about their biographies since age 16 
using instruments modelled on those developed for and used in the British 
Ken ROBERTS, Gary POLLOCK, Heghine MANASYAN & Jochen THOLEN 
 
Page | 110                                                                     EJBE 2008, 1(2) 
  
Household Panel Survey. As regards their labour market careers, respondents were 
asked, first, to recall by month and year every change in status to or from being a 
full-time student, employed, self-employed, unemployed, on national service, 
maternity leave, or otherwise inactive. They then supplied detailed job histories 
(full-time and part-time), recorded by month and year of starting and finishing. 
Jobs were classified according to whether they were in the public or private sector, 
or with non-governmental organisations (very few were with the latter), and 
according to whether the occupations were management, professional, other non-
manual, farm, other manual, or petty trading. Our initial step in dividing the 
samples into career groups was to place them according to whether at least 50% of 
their time up to age 30 when not in full-time education had been in one or another 
of the following: 
• Non-manual employment. 
• Self-employment. 
• Any employment not qualifying for inclusion in the above two groups. 
• Unemployment. 
• Inactive. 
• Other. 
As many as 94% of all respondents were accounted for by one of the first five 
groups listed above. The threshold for inclusion is at least 50% of time since leaving 
full-time education, but most had spent closer to 100% than 50% of their time in 
the relevant positions (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Percentages of all time since leaving full-time education that was 
spent in each career group’s definitive situation in the labour market  
 Non-manual Self-employment Unemployed Inactive 
51-60 3 8 9 3 
61-70 2 7 6 1 
71-80 1 10 6 - 
81-90 3 14 6 - 
91-100 90 61 73 97 
N = 290 166 391 118 
They had tended to stick either in particular kinds of employment, or to have been 
continuously or recurrently unemployed or inactive. This applied even when those 
who were in employment had changed jobs, and around a half of the non-manual, 
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other employment and self-employed career groups had changed jobs on at least 
one occasion (see Table 2).  In the unemployment career group 58% had never held 
a single job, and likewise 64% of those in the inactive group. Their jobs, when 
members of these career groups had held any, had tended not to last, and the 
individuals had tended to return to their original unemployed or inactive positions 
rather than moving on to new jobs. 
Table 2. Number of jobs up to age 30 by career groups (in percentages) 
 None 1 2 3 or more 
Non-manual 
employment 
- 49 32 19 
Other employment - 42 31 27 
Self-employment - 58 27 15 
Unemployment 58 29 9 4 
Inactive 69 22 8 2 
Other 16 51 26 7 
ii. Current earnings per month from employment or self-employment and any other 
income (when applicable). Respondents were also asked for details of their 
households’ total monthly incomes (under a set of headings), and for details about 
their households’ typical monthly outgoings (again, under a set of headings). 
Reported household expenditure was usually vastly in excess of reported income. 
We have estimated our respondents’ real personal incomes by multiplying the 
reported sums by reported household spending, and then dividing this total by 
reported household incomes. 
iii. Education. Respondents are divided in the following analysis according to 
whether or not they had progressed through higher education to at least BA level. 
The type of first degree courses that the respondents had entered had typically 
been 5-year Soviet diploma programmes which by 2007 were being or had already 
been phased out and replaced by the BA/MA, 3+2 regime. 
iv. Parental socio-economic status (SES). Points were awarded according to whether 
the respondents’ mothers and fathers were higher education graduates, and 
whether their normal occupations had been or were still management or 
professional, thus creating a 0-4 point scale which was collapsed into lower, 
intermediate and higher SES groups. 
The following analysis also divides the respondents by gender and place, variables 
which need no explanation. 
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Career groups and positions in 2007 
The career groups proved good predictors of the positions that respondents would 
occupy at the time of the research in 2007 when they were between one and seven 
years beyond age 30 (see Table 3). Respondents were more likely to be still in the 
non-employed than in the employed statuses, but this is mainly due to 15% of each 
of the employed (non-manual and other) groups dropping into inactivity, which 
typically represented females withdrawing from the labour market. 
Table 3. Career groups and current labour market status (in percentages) 
 Non-
manual 
Other 
employment 
Self-
employment 
Unemployment Inactive Other 
Full-time job 68 55 8 10 4 27 
Part-time job 8 7 3 2 2 3 
Self-employed 4 10 82 4 - 31 
Unemployed 5 13 4 62 2 11 
Other 15 15 3 22 92 28 
N = 271 123 163 384 118 62 
• 92% of the inactive career group were still inactive  at the time of the 
survey: only 4% had moved into full-time jobs. 
• 62% of the unemployed career group were still unemployed and another 
22% had become inactive: only 10% had moved into full-time jobs. 
• 82% from the self-employed career group were still self-employed. 
• Just 68% from the non-manual career group were still full-time 
employees: 15% had become inactive, 5% were unemployed, 4% were 
self-employed, and 8% were currently part-time employees. 
• Only 55% from the ‘other employment’ career group were still in full-time 
jobs: 15% had become inactive, 13% had become unemployed, 10% were 
self-employed, and 7% were in part-time jobs. 
There were also impressive continuities in the types of jobs that the respondents 
had held (see Table 4). 
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Table 4. Career groups and types of current occupations (those with jobs 
at time of survey only) (in percentages) 
 Non-
manual 
Other 
employment 
Self-
employment 
Unemployment Inactive Other 
Management 7 2 6 1 - 12 
Professional 42 8 3 25 14 14 
Clerical 47 13 3 17 7 20 
Farm - 4 47 3 14 10 
Manual 2 67 23 42 54 30 
Petty trading 1 6 18 12 11 14 
N = 224 90 154 69 28 50 
• Of all the current jobs held by the non-manual career group, 96% were 
non-manual. 
• 77% of the jobs currently held by the ‘other employment’ career group 
were manual, farm or petty trading. 
• These were exactly the same kinds of jobs – manual, farm and petty 
trading – occupied by persons from the inactive career group who had 
subsequently become employed: 79% of their current jobs were in these 
categories. 
• Persons from the unemployment career group who had moved into 
employment had a rather different job profile: 43% of their jobs were non-
manual, and the remaining 57% were manual, farm or petty trading. We 
will explain below that many of the respondents who had completed full-
time education then became continuously or mainly unemployed were 
well-qualified academically, the implication being that they had been 
waiting (probably wisely in some but not all cases) to be offered 
commensurate employment. 
Incomes from employment and self-employment 
Respondents who were currently employed or self-employed were asked about 
their current monthly earnings. They were asked to indicate into which from a set 
of listed bands their earnings fell. The bands were in the local currencies, 
subsequently converted into USD. Non-response was higher to this than to most of 
our questions, and as explained above, many of the figures that we were given 
appeared to be gross under-estimates. Respondents may have given their official or 
basic rather than their real total earnings. It has been a standard practice for 
private businesses in the transition countries to maintain a set of figures for official, 
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tax purposes that are very different from their real turnovers and expenditures. In 
the public sector some employees have routinely taken unofficial payments from 
members of the public, and casual second jobs have been quite common. As 
already explained, we also gathered details about the current monthly spending on 
different items of the respondents’ households, which is why we can be confident 
that real earnings were rather different from the earnings that were reported to us, 
and we are able to adjust their reported earnings accordingly (see Table 5).  
Table 5. Adjusted current earnings in USD per month of respondents in 
employment at the time of the survey (in percentages) 
 Non-manual Other 
employment 
Self-
employment 
Private 
sector 
Public sector 
Zero - - 33 - - 
-25 7 5 14 3 10 
-50 13 22 11 17 16 
-100 35 41 14 41 33 
-200 32 26 16 29 30 
-500 8 6 9 8 7 
-1000 4 - 4 2 4 
Over 1000 - - - - 1 
N = 239 97 180 156 164 
There was little difference between the spread of adjusted earnings in the public 
and private sectors, but non-manual jobs tended to pay more than other jobs. 
Management jobs were the best paid, followed by clerical, then professional. A 
third of the self-employed who answered the question reported zero earnings. 
They were nearly always among the 47% of the self-employed who were farmers. 
Actually they were nearly all working on family farms and any cash earnings would 
go into the household pot rather than into our respondents’ hands. Most petty 
traders and farmers were practising survival self-employment. None of our self-
employed respondents were oligarchs (see Hoffman, 2002). Few could even be 
described as established and successful business persons. Only 13% of self-
employed respondents had adjusted monthly incomes in excess of USD 200. 
Reconstituted career groups 
The career groups that have been used in the analysis so far are not real groups 
with visible boundaries and members who identify with the groups in question. The 
groups are really clusters of respondents who had tended, to various extents, to 
have spent age 16-30 in different types of employment and labour market 
situations. The clustering is by factors chosen by ourselves, the researchers, not the 
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respondents. The procedures have worked in the sense that 94% of respondents’ 
labour market biographies could be placed in one of the five main clusters. 
However, there are alternative ways in which the samples’ labour market 
experiences and current positions could be categorised. For example, they could be 
situated along a continuum according to their current earnings. This would be no 
less valid than our career group typology. 
Now it can be argued that earnings should be taken into account in assessing 
people’s labour market achievements, and we are also able to take account of 
respondents’ experiences up to the time of the research when they were all 
beyond age 30. As explained above, a minority of those who were formerly 
unemployed and inactive had subsequently moved into jobs. Others who had 
appeared securely settled in particular kinds of employment had become non-
employed. Accordingly, Table 6 reconstitutes the original career groups. Groups 1-3 
are the members of the original non-manual, other employment and self-employed 
career groups who were still employed or self-employed at the time of the research 
and whose adjusted reported earnings were at least USD 150 a month. Groups 4-6 
contain the remainder of these original career groups. Group 7 contains 
respondents from the unemployment and inactive career groups who were 
employed or self-employed at the time of the research, while group 8 contains 
those from these same career groups who were still unemployed or inactive. 
Groups 1-3 can be described as ‘getting on’, albeit in different ways and to different 
extents, groups 4-7 can be described as under-employed, in various senses. Group 
8 comprises the long-term out-of-work. 
Table 6. Reconstituted career groups, total sample (in percentages) 
1. Non-manual career, employed, >USD 100 20 
2. Other employment career, employed, >USD 100 8 
3. Self-employed career, in employment, >USD 100 9 
4. Other non-manuals 12 
5. Rest of other employment career group 5 
6. Rest of self-employment career group 12 
7. Unemployment and inactive career groups, in employment in 
2007 
9 
8. Unemployed and inactive career groups, unemployed or 
inactive in 2007 
16 
9. Other, with incomes > USD 150 5 
10. Other 4 
N = 742 
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Even when combined groups 1-3 account for only 37% of the total samples, 16% 
are in the bottom, heavily unemployed and inactive group, another 38% are under-
employed, and 9% of the respondents are unclassifiable (but some of these had 
adjusted reported incomes in excess of USD 150 a month). This profile is unlike the 
occupational structure in any western country, but in our view it represents the 
reality for youth in most local labour markets in the new market economies of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
At this point we simply note that our criteria for success, getting on, are quite 
modest: in some kind of employment for at least 50% of young adults’ lives outside 
full-time education up to age 30, in some kind of employment when interviewed in 
2007, with adjusted reported earnings of at least USD 150 a month, which was 
beneath the median in four out of our six research locations (the exceptions were 
Aran-Mugan in Azerbaijan and Shida Kartli in  Georgia, the poorest regions in the 
investigation). 
Predictors 
Respondents chances of entering, remaining in and getting on in the employed 
career groups had depended on where they lived, whether they were male or 
female, their education, and the socio-economic status of their families of origin. 
i. Place. Chances of a non-manual career were better in the capital cities, especially 
in Tbilisi, than in the other regions (see Table 7). In Tbilisi 45% of the respondents 
had followed the non-manual career route from age 16-30, 32% in Yerevan and 
29% in Baku. The percentages were lower, between 11% and 18% in the three 
other regions. Here we must point out that the Baku from which our respondents 
were drawn is the politico-administrative region of Baku which includes rural 
districts surrounding the city itself, whereas the official boundaries of Tbilisi and 
Yerevan are at the borders of the cities themselves. Chances of becoming 
chronically unemployed were much greater in the non-capital regions: 41% to 54% 
compared with 13% to 30% in the capitals. We should note that even in the 
capitals, especially Yerevan, risks of chronic unemployment were far from 
negligible. Predominantly self-employed careers accounted for between 7% and 
14% of the samples except in Shida Kartli (Georgia) where it was 34%, mainly on 
family farms. We shall see in what follows that self-employment was not usually a 
glamour career but a low status fallback position. 
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Table 7. Labour market career groups by region (in percentages) 
 Yerevan Kotayk Baku Aran-
Mugan 
Tbilisi Shida 
Kartli 
Total 
Non-manual 
employment 
32 18 29 14 45 11 25 
Other employment 20 11 9 11 12 5 12 
Self-employment 9 14 12 7 10 34 14 
Unemployment 30 54 21 41 13 41 33 
Non-active 7 5 22 14 9 6 10 
Other 3 - 7 12 11 4 6 
N = 202 200 191 191 187 198 1169 
ii. Gender. There were huge differences between males’ and females’ typical labour 
market experiences. The young women in our samples were by far the more likely 
to feature in the unemployment and inactive career groups: as many as 55% were 
in one or the other of these groups compared with 30% of the males (see Table 8). 
The males were the better represented in the self-employment and ‘other 
employment’ career groups. However, females outnumbered males in the non-
manual career group. In fact the young women were four times as likely to have 
followed non-manual than ‘other employment’ careers.  
Table 8. Career groups by gender (in percentages) 
 Males Females 
Non-manual 21 28 
Other employment 17 7 
Self-employment 22 8 
Unemployment 24 41 
Inactive 6 14 
Other 10 3 
N = 510 659 
Females had been the more likely to progress through higher education (41% 
against 29% of the males), as is the case today in most parts of the world. 
Thereafter they had tended to enter public sector employment: 48% of the women 
who were employed at the time of the survey were in public sector jobs compared 
with 26% of male employees. The males were more likely to hold private sector 
jobs (73% against 51%). Only very small proportions of both sexes were working for 
NGOs (1% of the males and 2% of the females). Our evidence suggests that unless 
the young women progressed through higher education and into non-manual 
(probably public sector) jobs, they stood high risks of failing to obtain any 
employment.  
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Now across our entire samples 91% of the public sector jobs held at the time of the 
survey were non-manual against 30% in the private sector. The young female 
graduates had tended to enter public sector professions where they could work 
according to their specialties (the fields for which they had been prepared in higher 
education) as teachers, in health care, social work, libraries etc. Advantages of such 
public sector employment, which may have been especially attractive to the young 
women, include hours of work being regular and generally shorter than in the 
private sector, and the availability of maternity leave. Employment in the public 
sector was also more secure than in the private sector: 23% of respondents who 
were employed in the private sector at the time of our survey had held three or 
more jobs compared with 13% in the public sector. 
Table 9. Weighted total personal incomes by gender, in percentages 
(respondents who reported some personal income only), in USD  
 Males Females 
-50 7 15 
-150 22 28 
-300 28 32 
-500 22 13 
Higher 22 14 
N = 336 271 
We saw above (Table 5) that there was little overall difference between the spread 
of earnings in the public and private sectors. However, the female employees in 
our samples tended to be earning significantly less than their male counterparts 
(see Table 9). There was no such difference between the self-employed males and 
females, only among employees. Some young women may have been paid less 
simply because they were female, but another likely reason for the gender pay gap 
will be that the public sector professions that they entered (despite the 
requirement of higher education) tended to be lower paid than other jobs. As other 
researchers have found (see Trapido, 2007), there is considerable gender 
segmentation and segregation in East European and post-Soviet labour markets, 
which generally works to females’ disadvantage, certainly in terms of pay. 
iii. Family socio-economic status (SES) and education. It is sensible to examine these 
influences simultaneously since family SES was an excellent predictor of whether 
respondents had progressed through higher education: 21% from the lower, 40% 
from the intermediate, and 69% from the higher SES groups. Respondents with 
higher education had been more likely than other respondents to have entered our 
non-manual career group (43% overall against 14%). The non-higher education 
group was more likely to have become self-employed (20% overall against 5%). The 
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relationship between higher education and these careers held even with family SES 
held constant (see Table 10). In contrast, with family SES controlled, higher 
education was making little difference to respondents’ chances of entering the 
‘other employment’ or chronically unemployed career groups. 
Table 10. Parental class, education and labour market careers (in percentages) 
 Low class, 
higher 
education 
Low 
class, 
other 
Intermediate 
class, higher 
education 
Intermediate 
class, other 
High class, 
higher 
education 
High 
class, 
other 
Non-manual 
employment 
28 8 45 23 54 32 
Other 
employment 
13 13 9 12 10 6 
Self-employment 8 21 3 17 5 19 
Unemployment 44 39 29 30 20 27 
Non-active 6 14 8 9 7 10 
Other 3 6 6 9 4 6 
N = 119 447 161 235 140 63 
Even with higher education (or none) controlled, family SES continued to make a 
substantial difference to respondents’ chances of entering the non-manual career 
group, and to their risks of unemployment. The explanation cannot lie in the kinds 
of cultural capital signalled by higher education qualifications. The true explanation 
must lie in some combination of social capital (useful connections) and cultural 
capital directly transmitted by families and reflected in respondents’ ambitions and 
strategies in the labour market, and their ability to signal employability to 
recruiters. 
Domanski (2000, 2001) has equated the widening of income inequalities and 
increased pay returns to education with the creation of meritocratic societies in 
East-Central European countries. We agree, in fact all the evidence agrees, that 
there has been a substantial widening of income inequalities throughout the post-
communist bloc. In the 1990s pay returns to education remained relatively poor in 
Russia compared with East-Central Europe (Domanski, 2000), and in our studies of 
youth labour markets in former Soviet countries in the 1990s the relationship 
between pay and educational qualifications was fuzzy. It is clear and wide in our 
evidence from 2007. Higher education was substantially increasing the young 
people’s chances of obtaining non-manual jobs in which they stood the best 
chances of achieving relatively high earnings. However, there are a number of 
qualifications that must be attached to the meritocracy hypothesis. 
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• In our survey higher education was hardly reducing the samples’ risks of 
unemployment. 
• Progressing through higher education was strongly related to the SES of 
respondents’ families. 
• Even with educational credentials controlled, family SES remained a good 
predictor of entering non-manual employment and avoiding unemployment. 
• Labour markets remain heavily gendered, generally to females’ disadvantage. 
Table 11. Reconstituted career groups by region (in percentages) 
 Yerevan Kotayk Baku Aran-
Mugan 
Tbilisi Shida 
Kartli 
1. Non-manual career, employed, 
>USD 150 
29 18 18 9 38 3 
2. Other employment career, 
employed, >USD 150 
15 16 9 4 6 0 
3. Self-employed career, in 
employment, >USD 150 
7 9 11 7 10 7 
4. Other non-manuals 12 5 14 11 17 12 
5. Rest of other employment career 
group 
5 3 2 10 6 4 
6. Rest of self-employment career 
group 
4 13 4 5 3 44 
7. Unemployed and inactive career 
groups, in employment in 2007 
16 12 3 4 3 15 
8. Unemployed and inactive career 
groups, unemployed or inactive in 
2007 
7 24 25 28 6 9 
9. Other, income > USD 150 3 0 10 7 7 4 
10. Other 1 0 2 16 4 2 
N = 137 113 126 114 126 126 
Who gets on? 
This question is best addressed using our reconstituted career groups (see Tables 
11-12). These tables confirm everything that our foregoing analysis has indicated. 
In order to ‘get on’ in the South Caucasus it has been a clear advantage to be a 
male, from a high SES family background, to live in a country capital, to progress 
through higher education, then embark on a non-manual career. This career route 
was the one most likely to lead to success in the labour market in terms of 
producing the majority among all those who were getting on, and in having a 
higher proportion from the career group who were succeeding than any other 
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career group. In this latter respect, the self-employment career group was close 
behind. Self-employment obviously means very different things when it is the 
chosen option of persons in otherwise advantaged labour market situations, and 
when it is a last resort survival strategy.  
Table 12. Reconstituted career groups by gender (in percentages) 
 Males Females 
1. Non-manual career, employed, >USD 150 18 22 
2. Other employment career, employed, >USD 150 12 3 
3. Self-employed career, in employment, >USD 150 12 4 
4. Other non-manuals 7 18 
5. Rest of other employment career group 6 4 
6. Rest of self-employment career group 14 11 
7. Unemployment and inactive career groups, in 
employment in 2007 
7 12 
8. Unemployed and inactive career groups, 
unemployed or inactive in 2007 
11 22 
9. Other, income > USD 150 7 3 
10. Other 5 2 
N = 411 331 
 
Table 13. Reconstituted career groups by education (in percentages) 
 No higher education Higher education 
1. Non-manual career, employed, >USD 150 10 34 
2. Other employment career, employed, >USD 150 8 8 
3. Self-employed career, in employment, >USD 150 12 4 
4. Other non-manuals 8 19 
5. Rest of other employment career group 6 4 
6. Rest of self-employment career group 19 2 
7. Unemployment and inactive career groups, in 
employment in 2007 
7 12 
8. Unemployed and inactive career groups, 
unemployed or inactive in 2007 
20 10 
9. Other, income > USD 150 5 6 
10. Other 5 1 
N = 452 288 
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Table 14. Reconstituted career groups by parental socio-economic status 
(in percentages) 
 Lowest Intermediate Highest 
1. Non-manual career, employed, >USD 100 8 24 40 
2. Other employment career, employed, >USD 100 9 8 6 
3. Self-employed career, in employment, >USD 
100 
10 7 8 
4. Other non-manuals 8 14 19 
5. Rest of other employment career group 7 3 3 
6. Rest of self-employment career group 18 10 4 
7. Unemployment and inactive career groups, in 
employment in 2007 
9 10 6 
8. Unemployed and inactive career groups, 
unemployed or inactive in 2007 
21 14 8 
9. Other, income > USD 150 4 7 6 
10. Other 5 5 0 
N = 341 260 141 
The reconstituted career groups enable us to compare the proportions of young 
adults in different socio-demographic groups who were getting on. The groups with 
the highest proportions were the Tbilisi sample (54% of all respondents) and all 
those from the highest band of SES backgrounds (also 54%). Higher education and 
gender (being a male) were also advantageous, but less so than living in Tbilisi and 
coming from a high SES family. The socio-demographic group with the lowest 
proportion of young adults who were succeeding was the Shida Kartli sample (just 
10%). These figures suggest that Georgia is a highly polarised country. However, 
the highest proportions in the chronically and persistently workless group were in 
Aran-Mugan (28%), Baku (25%) and Kotayk (24%). Young adults in Shida Kartli were 
more likely than elsewhere to have the option of survival self-employment on 
family farms. We note, however, that the proportion who were chronically and 
persistently out-of-work was as high among all females (22%) as among those from 
our lowest SES band (21%). 
One conclusion that we draw is that entrants to the labour markets in the South 
Caucasus are spread along an axis where, at one pole, for those from advantaged 
backgrounds and who live in advantaged locations, the struggle that they face is to 
avoid or to escape from under-employment and get ahead. At the opposite pole 
the struggle is to become or remain under-employed and avoid persistent 
worklessness. 
We have identified a glaring gender paradox. All the other predictors of labour 
market  success are either neutral as regards gender (family SES, place, and public 
or private sector employment) or suggest that females should be more successful 
School-to-Work Transitions after Two Decades of Post-Communist Transition: What’s New ?  
 
EJBE 2008, 1(2)                                                                                Page | 123 
 
than males (more likely to progress through higher education, and to be employed 
in the non-manual grades). Yet our figures show that males in their 30s were the 
more likely to be getting ahead (42% versus 29%) while 22% of the females 
compared with 11% of the males had been persistently out-of-work. The difference 
can be explained, but only in part, by the greater likelihood of young women 
interrupting their labour market careers, because even those in employment were 
less successful than males, certainly in terms of pay. There are two possible 
explanations, which are not alternatives. Employers could be less likely to hire 
females, and might pay then less simply because they are women. The second 
explanation, most likely to apply in the public sector professions where women 
predominate, is that women’s jobs are paid less than men’s jobs because the jobs 
are done by women. 
Discussion 
What’s new? 
Reported salaries were higher in 2007 than those reported in studies of young 
adults in the 1990s. Some of the rise can be discounted as monetary inflation, but 
in 2007 the young adults who had jobs were earning more in real terms. That said, 
there were still plenty of low paid jobs, and also plenty of young adults with no pay 
due to their unemployment or economic inactivity. The young unemployed 
themselves were not a priority group in poverty reduction policies, and in 2007 
most were not receiving state benefits (as had also been the case throughout the 
1990s) unless they were living as independent (of their parents) household units  in 
which there was no earned income. 
There were clearer links between family SES, educational and labour market 
attainments in 2007 than in any of the 1990s projects. In particular, the enduring 
influence (biographically and historically) of family SES was clearer in 2007. This is 
unlikely to be because the respondents in 2007 were slightly older than their 1990s 
counterparts (30s rather than mid- or late-20s). It probably indicates a settling 
down after the turmoil of the early- and mid-1990s. 
In our reconstituted career group typology the size of the successful group, those 
described as ‘getting on’, appears to have remained fairly stable since the 1990s. In 
1997 46% of a Tbilisi sample was in regular full-time employment or self-
employment, and earning full salaries. The proportions were 49% in Lviv and 44% in 
Donetsk, cities in west and east Ukraine respectively. In Moscow in 1999 37% of a 
sample of young people in their mid-20s were succeeding (on the criteria listed 
above). In the 2007 research the proportions who were ’getting on’ were 54% in 
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Tbilisi, 41% in Yerevan and 38% in Baku. In 2002, in Vanadzor and Telavi, regional 
cities in Armenia and Georgia, 25% and 16% of samples of young people were in 
regular, full-time, fully-paid employment or self-employment. In the non-capital 
regions in 2007 the equivalent proportions were 10%, 20% and 43%. The overall 
indications are that the proportions of young people who manage to ‘get on’ have 
not been rising. 
However, in 2007 those who were getting on were earning considerably more than 
their counterparts in the 1990s. In every region except Shida Kartli, between 17% 
(in Yerevan) and 29% (in Baku) of respondents with any reported income were 
earning in excess of USD 500 a month (on our adjusted measurements) (see Table 
15). Good jobs had become better paid, and these jobs were as likely to be in the 
public as in the private sector.  
Table 15. Weighted total personal incomes by place, in percentages 
(respondents who reported some personal income only), in USD  
 Yerevan Kotayk Baku Aran-Mugan Tbilisi Shida Kartli 
-50 10 3 15 14 4 19 
-150 13 22 12 40 25 41 
-300 39 35 23 15 34 24 
-500 21 24 21 11 15 14 
Higher 17 18 29 20 21 3 
N = 127 97 91 100 118 74 
We could enlarge the ‘getting on’ group by relaxing our criteria (such as the 
qualifying salary level). However, the criteria used are far from exacting: employed 
for at least a half of their time outside full-time education up to age 30, in a job at 
the time of the survey, and earning at least (an adjusted sum of) USD 150 a month. 
Our ‘getting on’ group contains the young people who really were getting ahead: 
22% of the males and 14% of the females with any reported earnings had 
(adjusted) monthly incomes of at least USD 500. We would defend our chosen 
criteria as offering the best reflection of the true situation. In every location in the 
research except Tbilisi the 30-somethings who were ‘getting on’ according to our 
modest criteria were a minority. They were getting on to different extents, with the 
numbers tapering sharply with each step above the baseline. Those who were 
‘getting on’ were outnumbered by the under-employed and the non-employed, 
except in Tbilisi. This continuity since the 1990s is a feature that makes youth 
labour markets in the new market economies distinctive. 
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The creation and maintenance of the career groups 
How had the particular career groups that we have identified (basically, just non-
manual then other kinds of employment, which could be further divided into public 
and private sector jobs, and self-employment) been formed, and how and why 
were they being maintained? These questions can be sub-divided. 
The first question, and the easiest to answer, is why individuals were tending to 
remain within particular career groups. The most plausible answer lies in normal 
labour market processes (see Roberts, 2006). In the 1990s Lepper and Schule 
(1999) observed how the international organisations operating in Moscow had 
created a distinct labour market segment. The number and scale of operations of 
these organisations were expanding, they were competing strenuously for 
experienced (in international organisations) staff, and a shortage of suitable labour 
was driving salaries upwards. Meanwhile, the Moscow labour market was flooded 
with young graduates who were capable of acquiring, but could not currently offer, 
relevant experience. A CV giving details of successful spells in any kind of job will 
enhance a person’s ability to obtain similar employment elsewhere. Thus in the 
South Caucasus non-manual and other jobs had become separated into distinct 
labour market segments, and likewise the division between public and private 
sector jobs. This segmentation may well account for the reluctance of university 
graduates to enter anything other than non-manual jobs. This will be despite the 
fact that young people who build biographies of prolonged joblessness thereby 
diminish their appeal to all potential employers. 
The more difficult question is how and why the particular career groups that we 
have identified had been created historically. Our hypothesis is that a major part of 
the explanation, which applies to all the career groups, lies in the sheer abundance 
of labour that has been available ever since the communist system collapsed. 
Employers have been confronted by an abundance of suitably qualified labour for 
all jobs suitable for beginners. In this context, it has been possible to restrict all 
non-manual vacancies to higher education graduates. Additional capabilities, such 
as familiarity with ICT and foreign languages, have also been abundant relative to 
demand. So the normal entry point has been clerical grade work. It has been 
unnecessary to offer structured career paths and promotion opportunities, or job 
titles containing words such as management or executive. On-the-job training has 
usually been perfunctory. Office employees have performed ‘Taylorised’ digi-tasks. 
Experience may have led to a promotion, but usually only to a higher clerical grade. 
Only a small number of posts, usually filled by persons known to be trustworthy, 
and where the incumbents act in place of the owners, have been classed as 
management. In the 1990s low salaries proved no obstacle to recruitment, such 
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was the abundance of suitable applicants. Such staff could be retained through 
periods when there was little work to do and when salaries might fall into arrears. 
Staff were on hand when they were needed. Since the 1990s employers have 
experienced no pressure to change these practices. 
In the new market economies there are no professions in the western sense, where 
the practice of and entry to an occupation are regulated by a professional 
association. Professional in the former Soviet Union means working according to 
one’s specialty, in the field for which the employee was prepared in higher 
education. Most professional employment is in the public sector – in education, 
health care, social work etc. It is always the employer who decides whether a 
particular qualification is a requirement. Private sector employers rarely have such 
tight requirements, but they all have specific tasks that recruits must learn to 
perform. Training can be kept cheap and non-intrusive by breaking the labour 
process into narrow ‘Taylorised’ tasks which can be learnt one-by-one. The manner 
in which employment is organised in the new market economies makes it counter-
productive (flying in the face of reality) to treat management, professional and 
clerical jobs as the basis of three distinct career groups and three labour market 
segments. 
‘Other employment’ rarely requires any particular educational background. 
Vocational education has shrunk or disappeared completely in most parts of the ex-
USSR. Numerical flexibility is a realistic employer strategy because it is possible to 
lay-off, hire on full-time or part-time hours, or simply according to current 
requirements. 
This is the context in which self-employment has become established as 
simultaneously an always available fallback position (usually in the form of farm 
work in villages or otherwise petty trading) and as a potential route to riches. 
All the above developments have taken place in a context of weak or non-existent 
trade unions and genuine self-governing associations of professionals, and minimal 
employment protection legislation. Strong states, where these have been created, 
have used their strength for other purposes. 
Multiple economies 
Our trickiest task is posed by the contradiction between the evidence from our 
research and the official figures that have recorded continuous growth of close to 
or even above 10% for at least 10 years. In all three South Caucasus countries 
official GDP per capita more than doubled between 1995 and 2006: from USD 461 
to USD 1281 in Armenia, from USD 488 to USD 1571 in Azerbaijan, and from USD 
458 to USD 1075 in Georgia, in USD values in the year 2000. There had also been 
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declines in the employment rates (the proportions of all 16-59 year olds in 
employment) in all three countries: from 65.5 to 50.8 in Armenia, 79.9 to 69.8 in 
Azerbaijan, and from 67.2 to 61.9 in Georgia (http://www.unicef-
irc.org/databases/transmopnee/). Moreover, the total populations in Armenia and 
Georgia had declined. All this is according to official figures. These seem to imply 
that the employed workforces in all three countries should have been faring rather 
well by 2007, much better than in the 1990s. Official data on GDP per capita and 
average salaries simply cannot be squared with our evidence even having adjusted 
respondents’ reported earnings. The mismatch is not just with official data: there 
are the dozens of 5- and 4-star hotels, and equivalent shops and restaurants, and 
the roads in the capital cities are now packed with western and Far East sourced 
motor cars. 
Our hypothesis is that the countries of the ex-USSR have developed multiple 
economies, at least two, between which there is little interplay. In one economy 
people trade in commodities (oil, gas, copper, electricity etc), money (large sums), 
and companies. The main traders are members of the political classes, ‘oligarchs’ 
who became fabulously wealthy during the ’honest robbery’ privatisations of the 
1990s, and owners and top managers of profitable businesses – TV stations, phone 
companies, alcohol and tobacco manufacturers, for example. Public officials in 
senior posts and top managers in profitable companies are able to benefit from this 
economy, and some young people obtain jobs into which some of the benefits spin-
off, but this economy has little relevance in the labour markets where most young 
people try to earn their livings. There is little trickle down. There are more jobs in 
the 5-star hotels etc, but the abundance of labour keeps salaries low. Average 
salaries and GDP per capita are skewed upwards by the incomes and wealth of a 
small number of players in the economy of the privileged. 
The most glaring contrast in the South Caucasus countries is in Azerbaijan. The 
country has been exporting oil for over a century. Its population could be among 
the wealthiest on the planet. In practice this oil wealth created the original oil 
barons – the Nobels and their ilk. The resources then benefited the Soviet state. 
What about since 1991? We know that some of the oil revenues have gone directly 
into Swiss bank accounts (see Levine, 2007), but these revenues have also boosted 
the Azerbaijan government’s budget. This has made it possible to raise the salaries 
of public sector employees, including school-teachers, albeit only to modest levels. 
There has been plenty of prestige building, especially but not only in Baku – new 
airport terminal, concert hall, and lots of high-priced apartment blocks where units 
are often bought as investments. Azerbaijan is also building a network of Olympic-
scale sport facilities to support a bid for the 2016 summer Olympics (Akbarli, 2008). 
These projects, like oil extraction, create jobs, but locally hired labour remains low 
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paid. The projects are likely to be managed by foreign companies whose existing 
staff fills the best paid posts. Some locals, including young people, manage to break 
in, but not many. Our respondents in Tbilisi were more likely to have non-manual 
jobs, and were less likely to be unemployed, though in employment they tended to 
be earning slightly less than their Baku counterparts. 
In our view there is no reason to expect things to change any time soon in the 
absence of autonomous professional associations and trade unions, and political 
parties that represent workers’ interests. The manner in which the new 
independent states of the former Soviet Union embarked upon their historical 
transformation has left enduring path dependent consequences. 
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